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Article 7

Carnivore: Taking a Bite Out of the Fourth Amendment?

INTRODUCTION

The Internet has become an indispensable part of life for
Americans in the twenty-first century. Of the 281.4 million
individuals living in the United States at the beginning of the new
millennium,1 approximately 123.6 million regularly access the
Internet. 2 Americans use the Internet to shop, chat, meet new
people, research products or issues, check sports scores or stock
prices, and chart their family histories, just to name a few of the uses.
The primary use of the Internet, exceeding all other uses by far, is
email communication. One study estimates that Internet users will
1. MARC J. PERRY & PAUL J. MACKUN, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, POPULATION
CHANGE AND DISTRIBUTION 1990 TO 2000: CENSUS 2000 BRIEF 1 (April 2001), available
at http://vww.census.gov/prodI2001pubs/c2kbrol-2.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2001) (noting
that the United States' population increased as of April 1, 2000, by 13.2 percent from the
1990 census) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
2. Nua Internet Surveys, How Many Online?, at http://vww.nua.ie/surveys/
howv_manyonline/n-america.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2001) (stating that according to
NielsonNetRatings, an estimated 166.14 million people had access to the Internet as of
August 2000) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). According to a leading
technology industry forecasting firm, "103 million new users will join the ranks of the U.S.
online population-a population that will then total 210 million and more closely resemble
the overall U.S. populace." International Data Corporation, eBuisness Advisor, Change
in Online PopulationWill Dictate Changes in eBusiness Market Models (Aug. 22,2000), at
http:llwwvv.idc.com/eBusiness/presslEBIZO82500pr.stm (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review); see also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521
U.S. 844 (1997) (holding unconstitutional several sections of the Communications
Decency Act, which prohibited the transmission of obscene or indecent communications
sent by telecommunications devices and prohibited sending offensive material to persons
under eighteen years of age). In its findings of fact, the district court noted that in 1981
fewer than 300 computers were connected to the Internet. Id. By 1993, that number had
grown to one million and, when the court handed down its decision in 1996, to 9.4 million.
Id. The district court noted that by the year 1999 it expected that 200 million individuals
would be accessing the Internet. Id
3. See IDC: Email Deluge Continues with No End in Sight, SUPPORTINDUSTRY.COM
(weekly e.newsletter), Jan. 2, 2001 at http:llsupportindustry.net/newsletter/010201.htm
("E-mail remains the killer [application] for the Internet, evidenced by the many
opportunities and challenges facing providers and users of e-mail.") (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter SUPPORTINDUSTRY.COM]. Even during the Christmas
2000 holiday season, more people online used the Internet to communicate than to shop.
See John Horrigan, The Holidays Online: Emails and E-greetings Outpace E-commerce,
PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, Dec. 31, 2000, at 3,
http:lvv.pewinternet.org/reportspdfsPIPHoliday-Report.pdf (pointing out that while
fifty-three percent of American Internet users sent e-mail over the holidays, only twenty-
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send ten billion e-mail messages over the Internet in 2001, rising to
thirty-five billion by the year 2005.1 Just as Americans employ the
Internet for many activities, they also use their e-mail for a multitude
of purposes: confirming a dinner plan, conducting business,5 catching
up with a distant friend, selling a product, or soliciting money. Not
surprisingly, as Internet and e-mail usage has become common to
everyday Americans, it has become common to another, more
troubling sector of American society: criminals. 6 According to
Donald Kerr, Director of the Lab Division of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), "In recent years, the FBI has encountered an
increasing number of criminal investigations in which the criminal
subjects use the Internet to communicate with each other or to
communicate with their victims."7
The law enforcement community has responded in kind by
employing the Internet to investigate crimes in which perpetrators
use the Internet. 8 Targeting the most popular online use-e-mail- 9
four percent bought gifts online) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Horrigan,
concludes that "Clearly, the online population sees the Internet more as a tool for
information gathering and communications than for commercial transactions." Id.
4. SUPPORTINDUSTRY.COM, supra note 3.
5. This Comment does not address the question of whether employers are allowed to
monitor employee e-mail communications. The Fourth Amendment regulates searches
only by governmental actors. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1983)
(noting that the Supreme Court consistently has applied the Fourth Amendment
protections to proscribe only governmental action). Thus, private employers are exempt
from Fourth Amendment regulation. Furthermore, private employers often use internal
e-mail systems, which they own and thus control. See Bill Gates, A Recap of 1997 Hits and
Misses, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 31, 1997, at Cl (predicting that most
corporations would use e-mail by the end of 1997). Another question altogether is
whether the Fourth Amendment permits the monitoring of public employees' e-mail. For
a discussion on the right of public employers to monitor e-mail sent by public employees,
see Scott A. Sundstrom, You've Got Mail! (And the Government Knows It): Applying the
Fourth Amendment to Workplace E-Mail Monitoring,73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 2064,2102 (1998)
(urging courts to adopt a "more robust reading" of the Fourth Amendment, which would
protect government employees from suspicionless searches of their e-mail).
6. See Internet and Data Interception CapabilitiesDeveloped by FBI: HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 11
(2000) (prepared statement of Donald M. Kerr, Director, Lab Division, FBI), available at
http://wwwv.fbi.gov/congress/congressOOlkerrO72400.htm (last visited Nov. 12,2001) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Kerr Statement].
7. Id.
8. See id. According to the FBI, electronic surveillance has helped to secure the
See FED. BUREAU OF
conviction of 25,600 felons in the past thirteen years.
INVESTIGATION, CARNIVORE DIAGNOSTIC TOOL, at http://wwv.fbi.govlhqlabl
carnivore/carnivore2.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) [hereinafter CARNIVORE DIAGNOSTIC TOOL]. In many cases, the evidence
could not have been discovered without the use of electronic surveillance. Ik
9. See SUPPORTINDUSTRY.COM, supra note 3.
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one such specific response to criminal activity on the Internet is the

FBI's "Carnivore Diagnostic Tool,"10 essentially an online version of
a wiretap." Subject to internal FBI rules and to laws that predate the
emergence of the Internet by more than a decade, 12 Carnivore allows
the FBI to monitor a suspected criminal's e-mail communications.13
The FBI describes Carnivore as something of a magic wand, which,
when "waved" over large volumes of e-mail, can be used to identify
and separate targeted e-mails from non-targeted messages without
violating the rights of those who use e-mail for lawful purposes. 4
Thus, *Carnivore allows the FBI to sift through vast amounts of data,
probing particular pieces of e-mail sent to or from particular subjects
while leaving all other messages virtually untouched. 15
However, privacy groups, Internet freedom organizations, and
civil liberties groups have all raised questions about Carnivore. 6 The
10. The FBI named the system "Carnivore" because it "get[s] to the meat" of an
investigation.
See CNN.com, FBI Says Carnivore Will Not Devour Privacy, at
http:/l/vwv.cnn.com/2000TECHIcomputing/07/21/fbi.carnivore/index.html (July 21, 2000)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review). In light of the controversy surrounding
Carnivore, the FBI may regret choosing a name with such aggressive connotations. One
unnamed top FBI official told CNN.com that criticism of the name and the system was
"somewhat sobering. We'll think further about [the name] in the future." Id
11. The scope of Carnivore's use depends on the scope of the authorizing interception
order.
See Richard F. Forno, Who's Afraid of Carnivore? Not Me, at
http:/vww.infowarrior.orglarticleslcarnivore.html (Aug. 2, 2000) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). A search warrant may authorize a limited interception. See id.
For example, the FBI can construct the system to intercept only so-called header
information, which is the information at the top of an e-mail message that usually includes
the names of the sender, recipient, and the subject of the message. See id Alternatively,
the FBI can program Carnivore to intercept the content of messages in addition to the
header information. See idt
12. The Federal Wiretap Act was passed in 1968 as part of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)). The Federal Wiretap Act
was amended in 1986 and partly renamed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.
Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.). See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2711, 3117, 3121-3127 (West 2000) for
sections pertaining to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.
13. Kerr Statement, supra note 6.
14. See id.
15. The messages are virtually untouched in the sense that they are compared against
a Carnivore filter, but they are not opened, read, or inspected, if the system operates
correctly. See CARNIVORE DIAGNOSTIC TOOL, supra note 8; see also infra notes 69-72
and accompanying text.
16. See CNN.com, supra note 10 (quoting the Executive Director of the American
Civil Liberties Union as saying, "The FBI's position is essentially, 'Trust us. We're the
government.' But we have a long history of the FBI abusing its authority."). According to
Deborah S. Pierce of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Allowing a system such as
Carnivore to be used unchecked by law enforcement exacerbates the problem of over
collection of data and has the potential to harm our society." Statement of The Electronic
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questions include whether Carnivore constitutes an illegal search
under the Fourth Amendment,17 whether the FBI can be trusted to
comply strictly with court orders authorizing Carnivore searches,18
and whether sufficient public oversight of the Carnivore system
exists.,9

FrontierFoundation: Before the Subcomm. on the Constitutionof the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Congress (2000) (statement of Deborah S. Pierce, staff attorney,
Electronic Frontier Foundation), available at http:llwww.eff.org[Privacy/Surveillance/
Carnivore/20000728_eff_housecarnivore.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2001) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Pierce Statement]. The Electronic Privacy
Information Center has likewise been critical of Carnivore. See Ann Harison, Earthline:
FBI Won't Monitor Our Network with Carnivore, COMPUTERWORLD, July 17, 2000,
available at http://wwv.computerworld.com/storyba/0,4125,NAV47_ST047214,00.html
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Michael Meehan, Is CarnivoreDangerous?
Controversy Continues: Researchers Claim Review of ProgramDoesn't Go Deep Enough
2000,
available at
Dec. 11,
To Say
For Sure, COMPUTERWORLD,
http://www.computerworld.com/storyba0,4125,NAV47_ST054998,00.html (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review); see also Ted Bridis & Neil King, Jr., FBI's Wiretaps to
Scan E-mail Spark Concern, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2000, at A3 (quoting a former federal
computer-crimes prosecutor's statement that "[i]t's the electronic equivalent of listening to
everybody's phone calls to see if it's the phone call you should be monitoring. You
develop a tremendous amount of information.").
17. See Pierce Statement, supranote 16. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. See Forno, supra note 11. Forno offers a critical review of Carnivore and then
discusses how Internet users can circumvent the surveillance system:
The FBI's website... calls Carnivore a 'diagnostic tool' versus an electronic
eavesdropping device. In reality, Carnivore is indeed a network diagnostic
tool... but to imply that Carnivore's primary use is as a 'diagnostic tool' is
stretching the Bureau's already-thin credibility a bit too far. That's like a
criminal claiming that the gun he shot someone with was not a gun but a 'tool' to
eject hot lead into a wall.
Id.
19. See Pierce Statement, supra note 16. According to Pierce, "Currently, there is
little if any public oversight over the FBI's use of its Carnivore system. The FBI has not
allowed the [Internet Service Providers] to inspect the device, nor have any of the
advocacy groups been allowed to examine it." Id. While FBI officials proposed allowing
certain universities to conduct audits of Carnivore investigations, those academic
institutions rejected the FBI's overture, arguing that the FBI proposals called for strict
controls that would prevent a truly independent review. Richard Stenger, Universities
Unwilling to Review FBI's Carnivore System: Agency's Restrictions Seen as Overbearing,
at http:l/www.cnn.com/2O00TECHlcomputing/09106/carnivore (Sept. 6,2000) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review). A computer security expert at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology told CNN.com: "Basically, [the federal government] can edit the
report, omit sections of the report, and decide never to release it." Id
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Additionally, while technology has advanced at lightning speed
over the past decade, the laws governing its use have not always kept
pace.
Carnivore provides one example of this phenomenon.20
Carnivore equips law enforcement with powerful technology,
enabling it to use the Internet as a law enforcement tool.21 Yet the
law governing the proper use of the Internet for investigative
purposes is in its infancy, where it exists at all.22
Focusing on the FBI's Carnivore system, this Comment explores
the constitutional privacy issues implicated when the nation's law
enforcement community uses the Internet to investigate crimes,
concluding that while the development of a tool like Carnivore is
inevitable, modifications to the current system are necessary. In Part
I, after detailing the emergence of the Internet, this Comment
discusses the Carnivore system in depth.21 Part II examines the
development of Fourth Amendment law, paying particular attention
to the legal system's treatment of traditional forms of communication.
24 Drawing the analogy between Carnivore and traditional electronic
surveillance,2 Part III examines the statutory scheme that has arisen
from the Fourth Amendment to regulate traditional electronic
surveillance.26 Part IV applies these traditional rules to Carnivore,
and concludes that although Carnivore is an inevitable and useful law
enforcement tool, the system requires minor adjustments and the
present electronic surveillance statutes must be modified to satisfy the
legitimate privacy concerns implicated by the system. 27

20. For example, the primary law governing Carnivore interception orders was
amended in 1995, well before the development of Carnivore.
See Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2711,
3117, 3121-3127 (West 2000) for sections pertaining to the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act.
21. See Kerr Statement, supra note 6.
22. See id.
23. Infra notes 28-117 and accompanying text.
24. Infra notes 118-96 and accompanying text.
25. Traditional electronic surveillance includes wiretapping, pen registers, and trapand-trace devices. See Kerr Statement, supra note 6 (discussing the FBI's traditional
electronic interceptions). A wiretap is statutorily defined as the interception of the wire,
oral, or electronic communication of a third party. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1994). A
pen register refers to a device that interprets electronic impulses that identify numbers
dialed on a telephone line. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (1994). A trap-and-trace device interprets
the incoming pulses on a telephone line and identifies the originating phone number. Id.
26. Infra notes 197-241 and accompanying text.
27. Infra notes 242-60 and accompanying text.
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I. THE INTERNET AND CARNIVORE
A.

The Development of the Internet

In order to provide an adequate foundation for a discussion of
Carnivore, this subsection will discuss the development of the
Internet, how the events of the developmental era impacted several
choices that the Internet's developers made, and how those choices

have resurfaced to play a role in the modern day. The Internet is
among the positive developments stemming from the decades-long
Cold War between the United States and the former Soviet Union.'

In many ways, the Soviet launch of Sputnik, the first artificial satellite,
triggered the Internet's development. 9

Following the success of

Sputnik, Americans worried about a communist satellite orbiting over
their heads." Additionally, America and its leaders believed that
Sputnik provided hard evidence that the Soviets had a technological
advantage over the United States that would prove decisive in war.31
In response to this perceived threat, President Dwight
Eisenhower challenged the nation's scientists and engineers to answer
the Soviet threat. 2 In addition to initiating the American space
exploration program, the country's scientists began to consider other
issues related to modern war, including how to survive a nuclear
battle.3
Key among survival concerns was communications,
particularly how Americans would communicate following a nuclear
attack3 As early as the 1960s, the Department of Defense 3s sought
28. Scott Ruthfield, The Internet's History and Development: From Wartime Tool to
the Fish-Cam, CROSSROADS:
THE ACM STUDENT MAGAZINE, Fall 1995, at
http:llwww.acm.orglcrossroads/xrds2-1/inet-history.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2001) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review). Ruthfield concludes: "The Internet we use today
is one of the few positive legacies of Cold War paranoia, providing efficient and
inexpensive communications between people around the world." Id.; see also ACLU v.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831-38 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (discussing the Internet's origins, its
common present-day use, and the various technologies available with respect to the
Internet), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) .
29. See PBS, Networking the Nerds:
The Cold War Heats Up, at
http://wwwv.pbs.org/opb/nerds2.0.1/networking-nerds/coldwar.html (last visited Nov. 12,
2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Networking the Nerds].
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. Id.; see also Ruthfield, supra note 28 (noting that the United States government
sought to develop a secure network of communication that would survive during war).
34. Ruthfield, supra note 28.
35. The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), a branch of the Department
of Defense, funded technology and military research projects. See BARRY M. LEINER ET
AL., A BriefHistory of the Internet, PartI, E-ONTHEINTERNET, May-June 1997, available
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to determine whether computers
at distant locations could
36
communicate with one another.
Using government funding, scientists began to develop a theory
called packet-switching, which forms the basis of current e-mail
technology.37 Under the packet-switching theory, a decentralized
computer network first splits a message into small chunks, called
packets, and then routes messages from one computer location to
another at a remote site."
The advantage of the decentralized
packet-switching method, as opposed to a centralized system, was
clear: if one network broke down or was destroyed during war, the
packet could be routed to another network.39 Additionally, if part of
the packet were lost or destroyed, other parts would survive and the
intended recipient would receive at least those parts of the message. n
Under the old centralized system, all information was routed through
one source, processed, and then sent to the end source.41 Thus, if any
part of the centralized system failed, the message would not reach its
destination.
Conversely, using packet-switching, "[w]ith every
computer having the same routing abilities, an enemy would have to
destroy nearly all computers on the network to make sure that
communication lines were dead. 4 n
The theory of packet-switching underlies modern e-mail
technology.4 3 When user A sends an e-mail message to user B, A's
4
message is broken into small packets when it leaves A's machine.
Each packet travels a different route to reach B.1 When the packets
reach B's e-mail box, the computer reassembles them into one
message, which appears as it was written by A.46
B.

How Carnivore Works

In order to discuss the Fourth Amendment implications of
Carnivore, one must first attempt to understand how Carnivore
at http:/lwww.isoc.orglotilarticles/O597/leiner.html. At various times, the ARPA also has
been called the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). See Ruthfield,
supra note 28.
36. LEINER, supra note 35.
37. See id
38. See Networking the Nerds, supra note 29.
39. See Ruthfield, supra note 28.
40. See id.
41. IM
42. Id.
43. See Networking the Nerds, supra note 29.
44. Id
45. Id.
46. Id.
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works. Using Carnivore, the FBI can monitor millions of packets
handled by Internet Service Providers (ISPs).4 7 Most users connect to
the Internet through an ISP, which maintains a network and
communicates with other networks maintained by other ISPs. 48 ISPs
use a technology called "packet-sniffing" to monitor and maintain
their networks. 49 Packet-sniffing technology allows ISPs to monitor
all the packets streaming through their network or to filter out certain
packets if the ISP only wants to monitor precise types of data. 50
Carnivore is a type of packet-sniffing software.51 As packets
stream through an ISP en route to the intended recipient, Carnivore
"sniffs out," copies, and stores particular packets for later review by
investigators." According to a review conducted by the IIT Research
Institute (IITRI) and the Illinois Institute of Technology ChicagoKent College of Law, 53 Carnivore can accomplish the sniffing,
47. See Jeff Tyson, How Carnivore Works, at http://www.howstuffworks.com/
carnivore.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2001) (explaining how Carnivore works) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review); see also Gavin Skok, Establishing a Legitimate
Expectationof Privacy in Clickstream Data,6 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 61, 67
(2000), available at http://www.mttlr.org/volsix/skok.html. An ISP is the entry point for
users into the Internet. Id. at 65 n.14. The user's modem connects with an ISP's modem,
and the ISP then hooks the user into the Internet. IdL
48. See Tyson, supra note 47.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See supranotes 49-50.
52. Id.
53. STEPHEN P. SMITH, ET AL., IIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE AND ILLINOIS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW, INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL
REVIEW OF THE CARNIVORE SYSTEM: FINAL REPORT (Dec. 8, 2000), available at

http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/publications/carniv-final.pdf (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) [hereinafter IITRI REVIEW]. The HITRI Review was much anticipated since
news of Carnivore first broke over the spring and the summer of 2000. The IIT Research
Institute (IITRI) and the Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago-Kent College of Law
released the 117-page report on December 8, 2000. However, criticism of the IITRI
Review already existed because the FBI released a draft of the IITRI Review in on Nov.
17th. See Jennifer DiSabatino, Update: Carnivore Report Mollifies Some, Leaves Others
Leery, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 22, 2000, available at http://wwv.computerworld.com/
cwi/story/0,1199,nav47_sto54373,00.html (quoting an Internet-company manager as saying,
"I believe, at least at a basic level, that the ITRI Review established that Carnivore
doesn't bite off more than it can chew. Now we need to put a leash on it and make sure
that it's only unleashed under a certain set of circumstances") (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). Another, more critical reaction came from the American Civil
Liberties Union. See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Slams Biased
Review Team Thumbs-Up for Government Snoopware Program "Carnivore" (Nov. 21,
2000), at http://www.aclu.org/news/2000/nl12100a.html (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review). The ACLU called the HTRI Review incomplete because the IITRI was
unable to review most of the cases in which Carnivore has been used and called the IITRI
team biased because it included several people who had ties to the federal government.
Id. After "further careful review" of the IITRI Review, the ACLU appeared to back off
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copying, and storing without interrupting the flow of the ISP's traffic
and without interfering with the transmission of the message. 4 More
importantly, perhaps, Carnivore is able to conduct "fine-tuned
searches" in which the FBI can configure the system to search for
extremely particularized pieces of data and thus significantly reduce
the risk of gathering non-authorized information."
In addition to software that allows the system to sniff out
particular packets, the Carnivore system also includes hardware. 6
After receiving approval to use Carnivore in an ongoing
investigation, 7 a technically trained FBI agent" works with the

special agent conducting the investigation and the ISP to set up the
hardware, which includes four components: a one-way tap into the
ISP's traffic, 9 a collection computer to filter and collect data, a
control computer to examine the data, and a telephone link from the
FBI office to the collection computer to connect the control and
collection computers. 6 After the system has been constructed at an
ISP, the collection computer remains on site for the duration of the
surveillance. To prevent on-site61tampering, the FBI does not leave a
keyboard or monitor at the ISP.
the position that the IITRI team was biased and noted that the HITRI Review included
several unfavorable conclusions regarding Carnivore. See Press Release, American Civil
Liberties Union, ACLU, EPIC Say Further Study of Carnivore Review Proves "Beast
Must Be Tamed" (Dec. 1, 2000), at http:llwww.aclu.org/news/2000/n120100.html (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
54. IITRI REVIEW, supra note 53, § 4.2.7, at 4-7.
55. Id § 4.2.3, at 4-4.
56. Id. § ES.4, at viii.
57. See infra notes 232-41 and accompanying text (describing the steps necessary to
obtain such approval).
58. The agent trained in technical matters is not the same agent conducting the
investigation. See IITRI REVIEW, supra note 53, § 3.2.1, at 3-3. The FBI separates the
responsibility of configuring the electronic surveillance from the responsibility of
conducting the actual investigation. Id § ES.4, at viii.
59. The one-way tap is also called a read-only tap. See id § ES.4, at ix. A read-only
tap fulfills the function of allowing the agents to read only the information with which they
come into contact, rather than to alter the packets or to initiate a new packet. Id The
one-way tap appears to be designed to satisfy the minimization requirements set forth in
the Federal Wiretap Act, which require agents "to accomplish the interception
unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1994).
60. See IITRI REVIEW, supra note 53, § ES.4, at viii. The telephone link allows the
FBI to monitor the surveillance from a remote site where the control computer operator is
located. See id. § ES.4, at ix. The control computer operator can alter the surveillance,
start and stop the collection of data, and retrieve collected information. See id.
61. See id. § ES.4, at viii-ix. Similar to the one-way tap, the coordination between the
agents and the ISP is designed to meet the statutory minimization requirements that
require wiretapping investigations to be conducted with "a minimum of interference." 18
U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1994); see also IITRI REVIEW, supra note 53, § 3.2.2, at 3-4 to 3-5. The
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Working with the ISP, the FBI agents determine the best
location to insert the one-way tap to minimize exposure to non-

targeted users. 6 Depending on the scope of the FBI's authority in a
particular investigation, 3 the FBI creates filters that allow for the
collection of targeted data while preventing collection of other data. "

At its most restrictive end, Carnivore's default setting rejects all
packets.6 5 At its least restrictive end, the selection of "a single radio
button 6 6 switches Carnivore from collecting nothing-its default
setting-to collecting all the traffic passing through the data stream. 67
At an intermediate setting, Carnivore is designed to allow for the

collection of specifically targeted data, based on a variety of different
criteria.'
When targeted packets pass through the ISP's data stream and
by the FBI's access point, the packets are copied immediately and
routed to the collection computer.69 The copied information then is
"compared against" the filter authorized by the court order.70 But the
Carnivore filter is not an everyday filter. According to the FBI, only
the information authorized by the interception order actually passes
through the Carnivore filter. 71 This seems counter-intuitive. An
ordinary filter takes all of one thing, and passes it through the filter,
coordinated efforts allow the ISP to offer less intrusive and more precise options for
conducting the investigation. See id.§ ES.4, at viii.
62. See CARNIVORE DIAGNOSTIC TOOL, supranote 8.
63. Internal FBI rules and informal practice require agents to obtain a court
interception order before using Carnivore in an investigation. See IITRI REVIEW, supra
note 53, § ES.4, at viii.
64. See id. § ES.4, at ix.
65. See id. § ES.4, at xi.
66. The "single radio button" refers to the Carnivore hardware setup, which
effectively turns on or off the data collection. Id. Among its various conclusions and
recommendations, the IITRI was concerned particularly with the "single radio button"
aspect of Carnivore. See id. § ES.5, at xiii. A simple mistake in configuring a filter has the
potential to lead to the collection of information beyond the scope of a court order. See
id. § 3.2.2, at § 3-5. Although creating the filters is "usually straightforward... the
potential for human error cannot be discounted .... Id. Possibly complicating the
problem is the fact that agents create filters based on information contained in court
orders. Id. If the court order is ambiguous and the agent converts the ambiguity into a
less restrictive filter than the court intended, an over-collection of data may occur. See
infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text (discussing the shortcomings in Carnivore
software with respect to auditing and accountability). When an identified over-collection
occurs, the data is sealed and given to a judge. See IITRI REVIEW, supra note 53, § 4.2.3,
at 4-3.
67. See IITRI REVIEW, supra note 53, § ES.4, at xi.
68. See id § ES.4, at x; see also infra notes 91-95 (discussing tests run by the IITRI).
69. See CARNIVORE DIAGNOSTIC TOOL, supra note 8.
70. Id.
71. See id.
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separating part of the whole from the rest. For example, consider an
air filter. An air filter takes all of the air, passes all of the air through
a filter, and separates the good from the bad. The Carnivore filter, on
the other hand, eliminates what it does not require before it reaches
the filter.
This distinction may have constitutional implications. If the nontargeted information passes through the Carnivore filter (rather than
simply being "compared with" the filter), then the FBI arguably is
conducting a search of the information.
Under the Fourth
Amendment, a government search generally requires probable cause
and a warrant.72 If the non-targeted information does not pass
through a fiter but instead is picked out before it reaches the filter, as
the FBI argues73 then a search may not have occurred. This issue
could be resolved by reconceptualizing the way a filter works.
Perhaps a filter does not need to first search through material before
rejecting it. Of course, resolving the question requires a closer review
of the Carnivore filter's operation, something the FBI has not yet
allowed 4
Once the Carnivore filter identifies targeted packets, they pass to
permanent storage on the FBI's collection computer 5 The FBI has
stated that non-targeted data is never stored on permanent media,
nor is any other information from non-targeted data ever collected.76
Every day or two, an FBI agent retrieves the captured information
with a disk and replaces the disk in the collection computer with
another.7 The information is then used in the investigation of the
targeted party and sealed by court order. 78 Under federal law, data
collected in violation of federal regulations may be excluded from use

72. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355-59 ("[S]earches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions."). The Katz test protects citizens from governmental
searches when a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). Under the Katz tests, courts must determine whether the defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether society is prepared to protect that
expectation. Id (Harlan, J., concurring).
73. See CARNIVORE DIAGNOSTIC TOOL, supra note 8.
74. Supra note 19 (discussing the FBI's reluctance to allow a detailed examination of
Carnivore's source code).
75. See CARNIVORE DIAGNOSTIC TOOL, supra note 8.
76. Id. ("No other data is ever stored to permanent media, nor is any information
recorded about the traffic that does not match the filters.")
77. See Tyson, supranote 47.
78. CARNIVORE DIAGNOSTIC ToOL, supranote 8.
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at trial.7 9 Additionally, federal law provides criminal and civil
penalties for violations of electronic surveillance regulations. 0
C.

Carnivore'sOperationalStrengths and Weaknesses

Despite strenuous arguments from privacy groups and civil
libertarians,8 ' the FBI so far has declined to make available the source

79. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2515 (West 2000). See also Gelbard v. U.S., 408 U.S. 50-51 (1972)
(permitting grand jury witnesses to refuse to answer questions based on illegal
interceptions). But see U.S. v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 568-69 (1974) (holding that the
government could use information obtained by wiretap even though the government did
not fully comply with statutory requirements). In Chavez, the defendant sought to
suppress wiretap evidence because the wiretap application misidentified the high-level
official who approved the wiretap. Id. at 569. The Supreme Court held that when the
application identified the official as the Assistant Attorney General as the person who
approved the order, when in fact the Attorney General had approved the order, that the
evidence could be used. Id The Court, however, held that when a lower-level official (the
Attorney General's Executive Assistant) approved the wiretap order, the evidence
obtained based on that approval could be suppressed. Id. at 570. The difference is that
Title III contemplates conferring power on certain officials, including the Attorney
General and Assistant Attorney General, and not on others. IL See also CARNIVORE
DIAGNOSTIC TOOL, supra note 8 (noting that "[tihere are significant penalties for misuse
of the tool, including exclusion of evidence, as well as criminal and civil penalties").
80. Violations of Title III may result in imprisonment of up to five years and financial
penalties. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511 (4)(a) (West 2000).
81. According to David Sobel, General Counsel of the Electronic Privacy Information
Center, "If the FBI really wants to provide any type of public assurance as to what
Carnivore can and can't do, there is no substitute for releasing that source code."
Meehan, supra note 16. See CNN.com, Security Firm Tests FBI Limits with E-mail
Surveillance Tool, Sept. 19, 2000, at http:lwww.cnn.com12000/TECH/computing109/19/
email.surveillance.ap (announcing that a private company is now offering an alternative
program to Carnivore that is "open source" so that the public and ISPs can see how it
operates) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Security Firm Tests
FBI Limits]. In addition to providing ISPs an alternative to Carnivore, the private
company's program, named "Altivore," may have implications with regard to the FBI's
ability to use Carnivore in particular investigations. The Federal Wiretap Act requires the
FBI to show that "other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(1)(c) (1994). This language suggests that when less intrusive investigative
procedures exist, the FBI must try these first or show why such procedures would fail or
expose agents to danger. Thus, it can be argued that the FBI first would have to ask ISPs
to use Altivore to capture information because Altivore is less intrusive by virtue of its
open source code and the fact that a non-governmental actor (the ISP) would conduct the
search. See Security Firm Tests FBI Limits. Providing Carnivore's source code to the
public would allow anyone with the capabilities to review the technology to assess the risk
to privacy, rather than relying on the FBI's pledge to respect privacy. IITRI REVIEW,
supra note 53, § 5.9, at 5-4. A non-governmental actor would conduct a less intrusive
search in the sense that the investigating entity would not be an entity with the power to
reduce one's liberty, as is the case with the government. The Founders apparently felt
private searches were at least less problematic because the Fourth Amendment only
proscribes searches conducted by governmental actors. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466
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code of the Carnivore software, citing concerns that public release
would allow criminals to learn how to circumvent the system. 2 In its
review, the IITRI supports the FBI's decision not to release the
source code to the public immediately, but suggests that the agency
work toward a public release by eliminating weaknesses in the
program that criminals might exploit.83 In reaching this conclusion,
the IITRI's report draws an analogy between Carnivore and
wiretapping technology, pointing out that privacy advocates are more
comfortable with wiretapping technology because they understand
how it works while they still do not understand the mechanics of
Internet surveillance. 4 Although releasing the source code to the
public would allay some of the concerns of privacy advocates, doing
so would not directly address the Fourth Amendment issues that

Carnivore raises.8
Because the FBI has not released the Carnivore software source
code to the public and because the JITRI Review offers the closest
inspection of the program as a whole,86 the IlTRI's analyses and
conclusions87 necessarily serve as the foundation for any discussion of
the program. The IITRI approached its review of Carnivore with
several issues already on its agenda,"' but the team sought out
U.S. 109, 113 (1967) (holding that Fourth Amendment protections proscribe only conduct
by governmental actors).
82. See IITRI REVIEW, supra note 53, § 5.9, at 5-4. The IITRI Review noted that
revealing the source code might provide to criminals who wish to avoid Carnivore
surveillance "the keys [with which] to do so." Id.
83. See id.
84. See id. IITRI makes two suggestions: The FBI should release the software code
once the exploitable weaknesses are fixed, or the Department of Justice should continue
to commission independent assessments of its various surveillance tools. Id- Revealing
the source code would allow the general public to assess the Carnivore software on its own
and would thus allay some of the public's fears. Id. In lieu of releasing the software code,
the continued review by independent groups would at least allow non-governmental actors
to assess Carnivore's uses.
85. See infra notes 179-96.
86. In order to conduct its investigation and install the software in its own
laboratories, the FBI gave the IITRI access to the Carnivore source code. See IITRI
REVIEW, supra note 53, § 2.3, at 2-2 to 2-3. By installing the software, IITRI was able to
run experiments with hypothetical situations to test the capabilities of the system. See id.
§ 2.4, at 2-3; see also infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (describing a few of the tests
IITRI performed on Carnivore).
87. See IITRI REVIEW, supra note 53, § 4.2, at 4-2 to 4-9.
88. See Id. §ES.1, at vii. The group's contract with the Department of Justice
requested that the review focus on four primary areas. Id. The FBI asked whether
Carnivore: (1) provides investigators with only the information it was configured to
provide; (2) affects the operations or security of ISPs; (3) allows for the unauthorized data
collection; and (4) provides operational protections equal to the risk the system presents
to privacy. Id
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additional areas to address by meeting with groups that have opposed
Carnivore vehemently.8 9 After meeting with these groups, IITRI's
investigation attempted to review: (1) whether Carnivore overcollects or under-collects the information it is authorized to collect
pursuant to court order; (2) whether Carnivore imposes any risks to
the operation or security of the ISP into whose data stream the
system tapped; (3) whether Carnivore risks unauthorized interception
by the intentional or unintentional acts of either FBI personnel or
anyone else, such as an employee of the ISP; (4) whether Carnivore
includes adequate protections that match the accompanying risk of
the system; (5) the capabilities of the system as a whole, regardless of
the intended and authorized use; (6) the entire process used by the
FBI, the Department of Justice, and the courts, with particular
attention being paid to the controls on and the auditability of the
process; (7) the actual and potential roles of third parties such as the
ISP; and (8) the function of the Carnivore software when combined
with other software.9"
As a part of its review, the IITRI conducted thirteen tests, using
hypothetical court orders, scenarios, and purposes for collection. 9'
The review team constructed one scenario in which Carnivore was
configured to collect information contained in the header, 91 including
the "To" and "From," but not including information in the "Subject"
header. 93 Another test sought to capture the source and destination
information for all of "John Doe's" activities on the World Wide
Web, in particular including the links "John Doe" accessed at a Web
page but excluding information after the Web page was opened. 94
The review team designed a third test to intercept only the packets
coming from and going to a "Mary Doe" at a regular e-mail address.95
89. These groups include the American Civil Liberties Union, the Electronic Privacy
Information Center, and the Center for Democracy and Technology. See IITRI REVIEW,
supra note 53, § ES.1, at vii. See, e.g., Pierce Statement, supra note 16 (explaining the
Electronic Privacy Information Center's opposition to Carnivore).
90. IITRI REVIEW, supra note 53, § ES.1, at vii. The IITRI Review expressly set aside
addressing or answering questions regarding the constitutionality of the system or the
trustworthiness of the agents who will be using the system to conduct investigations. Id.
91. See id §§ C.1-C.13, at C-1 to C-32.
92. The header of an e-mail message typically includes the "To," "From," and
"Subject" fields at the top of the communication.
93. See IITRI REVIEW, supra note 53, § C.1.1, at C-1. Incidentally, the review team
indicated that Carnivore failed this test. Id- The FBI attempted to fix the problem, but
the agency only provided a partial solution. Id. § C.1.4, at C-3. Carnivore's failure
resulted in the FBI's loss because the shortcoming in the software resulted in collection of
e-mail that "is not of much use" rather than over-collection. Id.
94. See id. § C.2.1, at C-4. Carnivore passed this test. See id. § C.2.4, at C-5.
95. See id. § C.4.1, at C-9. Carnivore passed this test as well. Id. § C.4.4, at C-9.
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Carnivore failed four of the thirteen tests by not collecting data that
matched the review team's configuration criteria; however, only one
failure appeared to lead to over-collection of data.96 The IITRI's
review suggests two important conclusions. First, because Carnivore
is far from a perfect system, the FBI needs to improve its filtering
technology. Second, when the system is configured properly and
when it operates according to the configuration, Carnivore may serve
as a highly effective and efficient law enforcement tool.
As a general matter, the JITRI Review argues that the safeguards
in place outweigh the potential risks of the system and therefore
tends to support the use of Carnivore in law enforcement.97 Among
Carnivore's operational strengths is the precision with which it can
collect data, if it is configured properly. 98 Such precise surveillance,
which allows Carnivore to gather large or small pieces of information
or any point in between, does not exist in other current technology. 99

The HTRI Review also debunks several popular fears underlying
much of the concern about Carnivore:100 that Carnivore could read,
record, and store all incoming and outgoing e-mail; that Carnivore
could monitor the Web activity of all ISP customers; and that
Carnivore could monitor all the other activity of an ISP.10 The
Review notes that in order to read, record, and store those messages
authorized by court order, Carnivore operates effectively only if 1it2
rejects a majority of the packets with which it comes into contact. '
Thus, the vast number of packets that stream through an ISP, when
combined with Carnivore's limited storage capacity, serve as an
important practical check against general surveillance. 0 3
But Carnivore clearly did not pass the HTRI Review easily. The
HTRI Review identifies at least four problem areas with respect to
96. See id. § C.12.4, at C-28. Over-collection occurred in test twelve, which used a
hypothetical court order authorizing the collection of certain e-mail messages sent to and
from a target that contained the word "planning." Id § C.12.1, at C-27. The test's
purpose was to determine whether Carnivore was able to collect e-mail directed to a target
containing a particular piece of text. Id During the test, Carnivore collected all of the
target's e-mail messages, regardless of whether the messages contained the word
"planning." Id.
97. See id. § ES.5, at xii.
98. See id. § 4.2.1, at 4-2.
99. See id.
100. See Pierce Statement, supra note 16.
101. See JITRI REVIEW, supra note 53, § 4.2.7, at 4-7. Other activities include instant
messaging, person-to-person file transfers, Web publishing, news groups, and online
purchases. Id.
102. Id. § 4.2.3, at 4-4.
103. See id.
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Carnivore's operation. First, in certain situations, Carnivore may
over-collect information. °4 This over-collection may result from
faulty software 05 and poor design.10 6 Second, although auditing is
highly important to security and accountability in a software system,
Carnivore offers no auditingY. Auditing refers to the ability of the
FBI to retrace the steps of its agents after the collection has
occurred.108 At the collection computer, the system always operates

in "administrator" mode. This means that the FBI cannot conduct
audits of individual uses of the system, because everybody who
accesses the collection computer does so as "administrator."1 0 9

Similarly, the remote access also does not provide an audit.1 ' Third,
104. See id. § 4.2.3, at 4-3.
105. See id. In one situation, the FBI configured Carnivore to operate only in the "pen
mode"--the mode that is supposed to be the effective equivalent of a "pen register"--and
only collect information in the "To" and "From" fields. Id. However, because the
software replaced each character found in the other fields (such as "Subject") with an X, it
allowed the testers (and the FBI agents in a real-life situation) to determine the length of
the information contained in each of these fields. Id. IITRI concludes that such
information operates as the equivalent of allowing FBI agents to determine the length of a
telephone call, whereas court orders authorizing pen registers only allow the collection of
information about who placed the call. Id.
106. See id. § 4.2.3, at 4-4. Carnivore places the minimal pen register and trap-andtrace equivalents and the full-collection mode in the same device. Id. This construction is
equivalent to one device allowing for a wiretap, a pen register, or a trap-and-trace,
depending on how that device is configured. Faulty configuration thus may result in overcollection, a problem easily fixed by separating the devices. See id. § 5.3, at 5-2.
107. Id.
108. See id. § 4.2.4, at 4-5.
109. Id. By requiring a non-investigating technical agent to configure the electronic
surveillance, the FBI has arguably created an informal oversight mechanism. This
oversight mechanism is extremely limited, however, because the technical agent has no
continuing responsibility to monitor the investigating agents' use of the electronic
surveillance. Additionally, Carnivore's lack of an auditing function prevents the technical
agent from conducting a post-investigation review of the investigating agents' use of the
electronic surveillance.
110. Id. The remote access software currently in use does not have an audit mode. Id.
But, even if the software did include an audit mode, an individual could delete any audit
because the collection computer is logged in under "administrator," providing no trail to
the individual who deleted the audit. Id. The lack of an audit function raises the
accountability question of whether the FBI can track the actions of individual agents
conducting a Carnivore surveillance for later review. Because no audit function exists, a
rogue agent conceivably could alter the permissible filter, gather vast amounts of data,
then erase any signs that such information had been collected. While the information
would be subject to the exclusionary rule because it was collected in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (ruling that evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is excludable in state courts), the
information would have some value to an agent conducting an investigation. For example,
the evidence might provide the agent with leads not otherwise available. The exclusionary
rule is subject to a "good-faith exception," which was enunciated in U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 913 (1984) (holding that evidence obtained when officers reasonably relied on a
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the ITRI Review raised questions about the integrity of the data
collected, a concern that has implications for chain-of-custody
determinations when the collected information reaches a courtroom.
"I Finally, the JITRI Review criticized the "Carnivore development
environment," which accounted for the auditing concern in addition
to other issues." 2 Because the FBI developers created Carnivore
hastily to deal with the emerging problem of crime on the Internet,"'

no formal development process existed.114 Thus, FBI developers
never addressed, or did not fully address, key technical questions." 5
Although the IITRI concludes that the FBI should continue to
use Carnivore despite the problems identified in the review," 6 much

larger questions persist, such as why the FBI chose to use a
surveillance program with important and troubling deficiencies, and
why it chose to do so in the absence of federal statutory controls to
regulate such searches." 7 These difficult questions tend to fuel
skepticism about Carnivore, despite its operational strengths. The

concerns about Carnivore, however, are not limited to skepticism of
the system's software. Indeed, the Carnivore system implicates values

fundamental to American
Amendment.

society embodied by the Fourth

II. THE CONSTITUTION AND CARNIVORE
A.

FourthAmendment Foundation
Because the federal statutes governing Carnivore are outdated," 8

the FBI and Department of Justice require their agents to comply
facially valid search warrant was not excludable, even though it was later shown that the
warrant was not supported by probable cause).
111. See IITRI REVIEW, supra note 53, § 4.2.4, at 4-5.
112. Id. § 4.2.6, at 4-6.
113. See id § 1.1, at 1-1.
114. Id. § 4.2.6, at 4-7. The IITRI report stated that "[b]ecause of this lack of formal
development process, technical issues such as software correctness, system robustness,
user interfaces, audit, and accountability and security were not well addressed." The
IITRI report further concluded that while the lack of a formal development process was
acceptable in the very early stages of development, the continued lack of a formal
development process for an operational system is "not appropriate." Id
115. Id.
116. Id. §5.1, at5-1.
117. See id ("Controls on use of Carnivore stem from FBI and [Department of Justice]
standards and practices as opposed to statute.").
118. The FBI performs Carnivore searches based on court orders approved pursuant to
the Federal Wiretap Act and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. See infra notes
202-47 and accompanying text.
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with statutes that regulate more traditional methods of electronic
surveillance.11 9

The

statutory

scheme

regulating

electronic

surveillance stems from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of search
and seizure questions. 120 The Fourth Amendment prohibits the
government from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures and
generally requires the government to conduct searches and seizures
pursuant to warrants based on probable cause. 121 The threshold

constitutional question, therefore, is whether the government is
conducting a search and/or seizure when it uses the Carnivore system.
If the answer is "yes," then the Fourth Amendment is implicated and

constitutional proscriptions will regulate the search and/or seizure."
If the answer is "no," then the governmental actors-here, the FBI-13

may conduct their investigations without constitutional concerns.
Applied to Carnivore, the threshold question must be asked of three
sets of individuals: the person who sent the message; the person who

119. See Kerr Statement, supra note 6.
120. See infra notes 197-208 and accompanying text.
121. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481 (1963) (holding that officers were required to obtain an
arrest warrant before seizing a suspect based on vague evidence); United States v. Jeffers,
342 U.S. 48,50-51 (1951) ("Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of
the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes."); Agrello v. United
States, 264 U.S. 20, 30-33 (1925) (finding a Fourth Amendment violation when officers
searched the home of a suspect without a warrant). Under the Fourth Amendment, a
governmental actor conducting a search or seizure of a constitutionally protected area
generally must obtain a warrant based on probable cause. Katz, 389 U.S. at 362; WILLIAM
E. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 5.1 (1990) ("[It is
generally accepted that, absent special circumstances, search warrants are required for all
searches in the criminal investigative area."). Although the Fourth Amendment does not
expressly require warrants for searches and seizures, it does require that all searches and
seizures by governmental actors be reasonable. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Supreme
Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to require warrants based on probable
cause to make a search and seizure reasonable. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330
(2001) (upholding a warrantless search); Katz, 362 U.S. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring);
RINGEL, supra. Several exceptions exist to the general warrant requirement, including
searches of automobiles, drunk-driving checkpoints, temporary seizure of luggage, and a
temporary stop and limited search for weapons. McArthur, 531 U.S. at 330-31.
122. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
123. A search arguably occurs when any e-mail message gathered by the Carnivore
system is subject to an FBI agent's review. A seizure argument is more difficult and
requires a close review of the technology. It may be possible to argue that the FBI seizes a
message at the point at which the FBI reroutes the message into the Carnivore system,
whether or not it passes through the Carnivore filter. See supra notes 69-74 and
accompanying text Consider this point in the context of ordinary mail. A seizure would
likely occur if an FBI agent intercepted a letter in the U.S. mail, copied it, and then sent
the letter on to the intended recipient. Whether this can be analogized to Carnivore
requires a close review of the Carnivore technology. The FBI says that it copies messages,
which probably means that the original message continues unimpeded. See supra notes
75-80 and accompanying text.
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received it, and the non-targeted Internet user whose e-mail the FBI
rerouted and "compared with" the preordained filter. 4
Over the past century, the Supreme Court has advanced two tests
for determining the scope of the Fourth Amendment.'2 Well into the
middle of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court held that the

Fourth Amendment applied only to "constitutionally protected
areas," basing protection on a bright-line, property-based standard. 6

124. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text. As to the Internet user whose email is copied and the copy is then rerouted, the threshold Fourth Amendment question is
impossible to answer without knowing more about how Carnivore actually operates. See
supranotes 47-80 and accompanying text. If Carnivore intercepts or inspects the targeted
message, it can be argued that a search has occurred. If, however, Carnivore rejects a
message before it passes through the system, one can argue that no search has occurred
and the Fourth Amendment is not implicated as to this particular person.
125. Despite the Fourth Amendment's more prominent role in today's constitutional
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court took nearly 100 years before stepping into the Fourth
Amendment arena. See Michael Adler, Note, Cyberspace, General Searches, and Digital
Contraband: The Fourth Amendment and the Net-Wide Search, 105 YALE L.J. 1093, 1100
(1996). Ironically, Mr. Adler's 1996 Note explores the hypothetical situation in which the
government possesses a tool that allows its agents to conduct an Internet-wide search,
pouring through millions of files but only passing on to authorities those containing illegal
activity. Id. at 1093. Because Carnivore searches at an ISP access point and does not scan
the entire Internet, Adler's hypothetical does not precisely predict Carnivore, but it is
eerily prescient. Adler concludes that early twentieth century Fourth Amendment
doctrine would protect individuals from such searches, while the "reasonable expectation"
doctrine under Katz v. UnitedStates, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), would not. 1. at 1101.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), represents the Supreme Court's first
significant fdray into Fourth Amendment law. See id. at 1101. In Boyd, the Court found
protection of property to be at the core of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 630 (finding that
a constitutional violation occurs not in "the breaking of [a citizen's] doors, and the
rummaging of his drawers... but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal
security, personal liberty and private property .... "). The Boyd case stemmed from the
conviction of members of the E.A. Boyd and Sons firm for violating customs duty. Id at
618-19. The government seized thirty-five cases of plate glass, alleging the firm failed to
pay the required duties and citing a federal statute as authority for seizing the property. Id
at 617-18. In addition to seizing the plate glass, the government also seized the firm's
records and used the documents to convict the members of the firm. Id. at 618. In
overturning the convictions of the defendants, the Court held that an individual's interest
in his own property outweighed the government's interest in prosecuting crime. Id at 631.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court examined American and English history. Id at 62426. According to the Court, the English authorized revenue officers with "writs of
assistance" to search suspected places in the colonies for smuggled goods at their
discretion. Id. at 625. The English practice "was perhaps the most prominent event which
inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the oppressions of the mother country." Id
This English practice and resistance to it were in the minds of those who wrote the Fourth
Amendment. Id
126. See Adler, supra note 125, at 1100.
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Under the Court's property-based view, only physical trespass onto
land violated the protections of the Fourth Amendment.127
In its landmark decision in Katz v. United States,128 the Court
discarded the property-based doctrine in favor of a balancing
approach. 129 Under the Katz doctrine, two threshold questions
govern an inquiry with respect to whether a Fourth Amendment
violation has occurred: whether the defendant has a subjective
society is prepared to
expectation of privacy, and if so, whether
30
reasonable.
as
recognize that expectation
In Katz, the government placed a bug on the outside of a

telephone booth frequently used by a man suspected of illegal
gambling. 131 Because the property-based standard governed Fourth
Amendment cases when Katz reached the Supreme Court, both sides
spent considerable time arguing whether the telephone booth was a
"constitutionally protected area."'' 32 However, the Court expressly

discarded the property-based standard. 133 "[T]his effort to decide
whether or not a given 'area,' viewed in the abstract, is
'constitutionally protected' deflects attention from the problem
127. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that because the
government agents made no "actual physical invasion" of the defendants' homes, no
Fourth Amendment violation had occurred). Interestingly, Olmstead, decided under the
active but archaic property-based standard, represents the Supreme Court's first foray into
the wiretap issue. Id. at 439. The case dealt with a situation in which government agents
wiretapped the home and office phones of four suspects, who were charged with and
convicted of violating the National Prohibition Act. Id. at 455-57. Agents tapped the
suspects' telephone lines and recorded their conversations in order to gain the convictions.
Id. The Court held that "[t]he reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a
telephone instrument with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite
outside, and that the wires beyond his house and messages while passing over them are not
within the protection of the Fourth Amendment." Ild. at 466. Later, in Silverman v.
United States, the court held that government agents violated a suspect's Fourth
Amendment rights when they placed a microphone in the heating duct of the suspect's
home. 365 U.S. 505, 511-12 (1961). By crossing into the suspect's physical space and thus
the suspect's property, the government violated the suspect's Fourth Amendment rights.
Id. at 509-10.
128. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
129. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Harlan's concurrence, rather than the majority
opinion, created the standard courts today use to evaluate Fourth Amendment claims.
See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1979) (applying Harlan's two-pronged
analysis to a Fourth Amendment case).
130. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
131. 1d at 348. In rejecting the defendant's argument to exclude the evidence, the
Court of Appeals ruled that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because the
government did not physically enter the telephone booth, which was the space the
defendant occupied. See id. at 348-49.
132. Id. at 351.
133. Id at 351-53.
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presented in this case. For the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places." 4 After rejecting the longstanding property-based
standard, the Court ruled that what an individual attempts to
preserve as private may receive constitutional
protection, even if the
135
area in which the activity occurs is in public.
The Court then established the new test and the two prongs on
which the test turns: whether the individual has a subjective
expectation of privacy, and whether that expectation is objectively
reasonable.13 6 Turning to the facts of the case, the Court held that the
defendant entered the telephone booth, closed the door behind him,
and thus had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 13 7 This expectation
was also reasonable; to rule otherwise would have been "to ignore the
vital role that the
public telephone has come to play in private
8
communication.

'13

Rather than solely protecting property rights, the Fourth
Amendment after Katz protects a wide variety of interests from
unreasonable searches and seizures, including one's interest in
privacy,'139 security, ° and liberty.' 4 1

134. Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 351-52 (citing Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960) and Ex Parte
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877)).
136. Id at 352.
137. Id
138. Id.
139. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (holding that forcing a suspect to
undergo surgery to remove a bullet from his leg sustained during a robbery would violate
the suspect's Fourth Amendment rights); see also Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498
(1958) ("[I]t is difficult to imagine a more severe invasion of privacy than the nighttime
intrusion into a private home than occurred in this instance.").
140. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662-63 (1978) (holding discretionary traffic
stops unsupported by an articulable and reasonable suspicion unconstitutional because
they violate the individual's security interest protected by the Fourth Amendment); see
also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,554 (1976) ("The Fourth Amendment
imposes limits on search-and-seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppressive
interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and security of individuals.").
141. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1974) (citing Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966)). In
holding unconstitutional a search conducted by Border Patrol over sixty miles from the
U.S. border, the Court wrote, "the central concern of the Fourth Amendment is to protect
liberty and privacy from arbitrary and oppressive interference by government officials."
Id.
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The FourthAmendment and Cyberspace

Despite the expanding breadth of the Fourth Amendment
following Katz, the Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether

individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their e-mail. 142
However, applying the two-prong Katz balancing test and comparing
e-mail to other forms of communication,143 the Court will almost

certainly extend Fourth Amendment protection to e-mail.
Based on the Katz analysis, the threshold question when
evaluating a governmental action in this context is whether
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their e-mail."44
If so, the government conducts a "search" for purposes of the Fourth

Amendment. Unfortunately, only a few lower court decisions have
applied the Fourth Amendment to the Internet, none of which
appears to address the circumstances of e-mail. 45 Instead, courts that
have addressed the Internet and the Fourth Amendment have dealt

with whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in two other
circumstances:
first, when Internet users voluntarily exchange
information online; and second, when Internet users share

information offline with their ISPs.' 46 In both cases, the courts have
found no reasonable expectation of privacy. 47 Each of these
circumstances is easily distinguishable from e-mail, which arguably
48
entails a greater expectation of privacy.
In a recent formal opinion, 149 the American Bar Association

(ABA) addressed whether e-mail communication between clients and
142. See Skok, supra note 47, at 72. Skok examined whether clickstream data should
enjoy Fourth Amendment protection, arguing that it should because Web users have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the data. A clickstream is the footprint Web users
create when they visit Web sites. Id. at 64. Each time a Web user clicks his mouse, he
sends an electronic signal across the Web, and that electronic signal can be tracked. Id.
"This data can be shockingly revealing, providing a record of the entirety of one's online
experience." Id. at 64-65. Although Skok concludes that Web users have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in clickstream data, he acknowledges that post-Katz Fourth
Amendment law does not support his conclusion. l at 64. Rather, he supports his
argument by referring to the history of the Fourth Amendment and the intent of its
drafters. Id. at 62.
143. For example, this Comment will briefly review the protections afforded faxes and
cordless telephone communications. See infra notes 166-78 and accompanying text.
144. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,352 (1967).
145. See Skok, supra note 47, at 72.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See infra notes 179-96 and accompanying text (applying the two pronged Katz
analysis to e-mail).
149. ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999)
[hereinafter ABA Opinion].
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150
attorneys violates the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
The ABA concluded that a lawyer may communicate via e-mail with

a client without violating the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct because the medium affords a reasonable expectation of
privacy.'" In reaching its conclusion, the ABA discussed other forms

of communication and determined whether each of these forms
enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy.'5 2 The ABA reviewed

the rules regarding ordinary U.S. mail and commercial mail, land-line
telephones, cordless and cellular phones, and faxes. 53 The ABA's
report provides useful insight because the Supreme Court likely
would employ a similar analysis when it addresses whether e-mail
should receive Fourth Amendment protections in the future.

1. U.S. and Commercial Mail
Caselaw supports the ABA's conclusion"M that a reasonable

expectation of privacy extends to U.S. and commercial mail. 55 The
ABA noted in its opinion that the reasonable expectation of privacy

exists even though mail can be lost, stolen, or misplaced once it leaves
the sender.156 In Ex Parte Jackson,57 the Supreme Court held that
letters and sealed packages are protected against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Moreover, the Court stated that governmental
authorities must obtain a warrant based on probable cause before
153
opening them.

150. The ABA issued the Formal Opinion to address whether lawyers could
communicate via e-mail with their clients or others about client-related matters without
violating the client's expectation of confidentiality. See MODEL RULES OF PROF.
RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.6(a) (1998). The ABA concluded that a lawyer may communicate
via e-mail with a client without violating confidentiality expectations, but should follow
the client's instructions with respect to highly sensitive information regarding a client
matter. ABA Opinion, supra note 149, at 181. The ABA Opinion only addresses
Carnivore interceptions of unencrypted e-mail. E-mail is sometimes encrypted, usually
using special software programs, to discourage someone who intercepts the message from
being able to decipher the content. While some of the e-mail Carnivore targets might be
encrypted, certainly most of it is not because encryption technology is not widely used.
151. See ABA Opinion, supra note 149, at 188.
152. See id. at 182-85.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 183.
155. See Ex ParteJackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) ("Letters and sealed packages...
are as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and
weight, as if they were retained by parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.").
156. See ABA Opinion, supra note 149, at 183.
157. 96 U.S. at 733.
158. Id.
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2. Land-Line Telephones

Because the Supreme Court held that a reasonable expectation
of privacy exists in the use of a public telephone,'59 the use of a
private telephone also will receive Fourth Amendment protection
because the expectation of privacy would be even greater. According
to the ABA, a reasonable expectation of privacy is "undisputed" in
the use of a telephone. 16° The reasonable expectation exists despite
the fact that, as with U.S. and commercial mail communications, the

telephone is not an absolutely secure medium. 161 Telephone
conversations can be intercepted with wiretaps, overheard when
multiple extensions exist, and eavesdropped upon when the
telephone company commits a technical error. 62 Additionally, under
limited circumstances, telephone companies are permitted to monitor
conversations.263
Similarly, e-mail communications should receive at least the
same level of protection as telephone communications. While e-mail
communications are not absolutely secure-ISPs can monitor email, 164 e-mail wiretap technology like Carnivore exists, and the
potential for transmission error exists' 6 5-they are no less secure than
telephone conversations, and thus deserve at least the same

protection.
3. Cordless and Cellular Phones
Prior to 1994, cordless and cellular communications were not
afforded the same Fourth Amendment protection as traditional

159. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,352 (1967).
160. See ABA Opinion, supra note 149, at 183.
161. Id.
162. Id
163. Id.
164. See Tyson, supra note 47. The Fourth Amendment would not prevent ISPs from
monitoring e-mail communications because they are not governmental actors, and the
Fourth Amendment only applies to governmental actors. See United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109, 113 (1967) (holding that Fourth Amendment protections proscribe only
conduct by governmental actors). In Jacobsen, employees of a private freight carrier
examined a white powdery substance coming from a damaged package. Id. at 111. They
called federal agents, who determined that the substance was cocaine. Id The owner of
the package was convicted on drug charges, and, on appeal, asserted that the search
violated his constitutional rights. Id The Court held that the private company employees
were not regulated by the Fourth Amendment, id at 113, and that the government agents
did not violate the defendant's rights because the seizure of the package was not
unreasonable. Id. at 121-22.
165. For example, a user who misspells an e-mail address will transmit the message to
someone other than the intended recipient.
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telephone conversations. 166 At least two circuits declined to extend
protection to cordless and cellular communications, in part because
the absence of protective federal laws undermined a reasonable
expectation of privacy. 167 However, the Federal Wiretap Act"s now
prohibits the intentional and unauthorized interception of cordless
and cellular communications; 169 thus privacy advocates can make a
stronger case that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.
Nevertheless, cordless and cellular communication expose users
to disclosure risks that do not exist with e-mail. 170 Cordless phones
use FM and AM radio waves to send signals to base units, which then
forward the signal to the land-based lines. 171 The disclosure and
interception risks thus include not only the risks associated with
traditional telephones, but also the risk that the communication may
be intercepted by radios, baby monitors, and other cordless phones. 7,
Further, cordless conversations are comprehensible upon interception
or disclosure, as opposed to e-mail communications, which are not
immediately understandable in digital format.
As with cordless phones, cellular phones present disclosure risks
that are not present with e-mail communications. In fact, the risks are
greater with cellular phones than with cordless phones because
cellular phones transmit radio signals to towers, which then feed the
signal to a land line. The distance from the cellular phone to the
tower is larger than the distance from a cordless phone to its base
unit.'73 The larger area over which the cellular transmission travels
increases the possibility of disclosure or interception."
Because
cordless and cellular telephone communications expose users to a
heightened risk of disclosure and interception, the expectation of
privacy is correspondingly lower than e-mail communications. E-mail
166. See ABA Opinion, supra note 149, at 183-85.
167. See McKarney v. Roach, 55 F.3d 1236, 1238-40 (6th Cir. 1995); In re Askin, 47
F.3d 100, 104-05 (4th Cir. 1995). The cases reflect the dual operation of Katz's two
prongs: although an individual might have had a first-prong reasonable expectation of
privacy in a cordless or cellular conversation, the silence of federal law on the matter
undercut the second prong requiring society to accept that expectation as reasonable.
168. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, ch. 119, 82 Stat. 212 (1968)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994)); see also infra notes 197-214 and
accompanying text (discussing the origins of the Act).
169. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1994) (prohibiting the interception of wire, oral, or
electronic communication).
170. See ABA Opinion, supra note 149, at 184.
171. Id.
172. See id.
173. Id.
174. See id.

340
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communications thus deserve protection greater than cordless and
cellular phones and at least equal to that of land-line telephones.
4. Faxes
Communication via fax machine presents risks clearly not
present with e-mail messages.
The ABA opinion, however,
authorizes the use of faxes and concludes that such communication is
consistent with the attorney's duty of confidentiality. 75
Risks
associated with the use of fax machines include the misdialing of a
number and the tendency of faxes to pass through the hands of an
intermediary, such as a secretary, before they reach the intended
recipient. 176
Despite the risks of interception and disclosure,
individuals enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in their faxes as
illustrated by the fact that the ABA 177 and at least one court have
concluded that the use of faxes conforms with the attorney's duty of
178
confidentiality.
Unlike faxes, e-mail messages are sent directly to the e-mail inbox of the intended recipient. Although someone with access to the
e-mail message box might open an e-mail intended for another
recipient, this risk exists with regular mail as well and thus should not
defeat the reasonable expectation of privacy.
Thus, because
communication sent via fax machines presents a greater risk of
interception than communication sent via e-mail and yet still carries a
reasonable expectation of privacy, e-mail communication warrants at
least as much protection as fax communication.
5. E-mail communications
In most instances, e-mail messages afford greater security than
traditional forms of communication, both because of the packetswitching technology at their foundation and the possibility of
encryption. 179 As noted earlier, packet-switching technology breaks
an e-mail message into several packets, each of which travels over a
175. Id. at 185.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See State ex rel. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Canady, 460 S.E.2d 677, 689
(W. Va. 1995) (ruling that communications sent over fax machines were protected by the
attorney-client privilege); see also Peter R. Jarvis & Bradley F. Tellam, High-Tech Ethics
and Malpractice Issues, 1996 SYMPOSIUM ISSUE OF THE PROF. LAw., 51, 55 (1996)
(concluding that "courts seem to have taken it for granted that fax machines may be used"
when confidential information is communicated).
179. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text; see also supra note 150 (discussing
encryption technology).
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decentralized network, following a different route to the intended

recipient. 180 When the recipient's computer reassembles the packets
and the recipient opens the e-mail, the message appears as it did
when it left the sender's machine.' 81 Thus, intercepting an entire email message as it travels over the decentralized network would
require interception at many, indeterminable points. ' 8 In this
respect, e-mail sent using the packet-switching technology is more
secure than regular mail and land-line telephone communications.
But not all e-mail users employ packet-switching technology."a 3
Some e-mail users configure their modems to dial the intended
recipient's modem, and send the e-mail over landlines directly to the
recipient's machine.', Interception of e-mail using direct dialing
requires a sophisticated wiretap. The wiretap must be more advanced
than the type used for telephone taps because it not only intercepts
the message, but it also deciphers the message in its digital format.185
Complicating the analysis is the fact that most people
communicate via ISPs.' 86 An ISP makes e-mail message boxes
available in an online public forum to which other ISP members have
access, although passwords protect the message boxes.'1
Additionally, ISPs can and have monitored e-mail communication for
various reasons."s However, both federal law 89 and internal ISP
policies 9" provide limits on such ISP monitoring.
Considering the strengths and weaknesses of e-mail security, the
analysis then turns to the two-pronged Katz test:'9 ' Do e-mail users

180. See supranotes 37-46 and accompanying text.
181. See supranotes 37-46 and accompanying text.
182. See supranotes 37-46 and accompanying text.
183. See David Hricik, Lawyers Worry Too Much about Transmitting Client
Confidences by Internet E-mail, 11 GEO. J. LEGALETHIcS 459,485 (1998).
184. See id.
185. See ABA Opinion, supra note 149, at 185.
186. See Jeffrey Pollock, A Tangled Web-Thoughts for a Law Firm Using the Web,
198 NJ. LAW. 18, 19 (1999) (noting that "virtually all" users access the Internet through
the ISPs).
187. See ABA Opinion, supra note 149, at 187-88.
188. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
189. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (West 2000) (allowing employees of electronic
communication service providers to intercept, disclose, or communicate messages in the
normal course of business). This subsection prohibits observing or random monitoring,
but an exception exists for mechanical or service quality control checks. Id.
190. See Iricik, supra note 183, at 489. For example, America Online prohibits
monitoring of customer e-mail except in three instances: (1) to comply with the law; (2) to
protect the rights of America Online; and (3) to monitor e-mail when the company
believes someone's safety is at risk. Id
191. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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have a subjective expectation of privacy when they communicate via
e-mail? If so, is this privacy interest one that society considers to be
reasonable? Because e-mail offers security equal to or greater than
U.S. and commercial mail, faxes, and land-line telephone
conversations, an e-mail user's expectation of privacy should be equal
to or greater than those forms of communication. Courts generally
grant these forms of communication a reasonable expectation of
privacy, and thus e-mail should receive the same treatment from
courts, thereby satisfying the first Katz prong.
Applying the second prong to e-mail messages produces a more
ambiguous result. While society chooses to protect e-mail messages
in certain instances, 192 it has not yet done so in other instances. One
glaring example regards interception laws, 193 which do not directly
address programs such as Carnivore but cover telephone wiretapping,
pen registers, and trap-and-trace surveillance. 94 But, because e-mail
clears the first Katz hurdle and because society has taken some steps
to protect e-mail, 95 courts likely will conclude that e-mail
communications warrant protection under Katz. Thus, because email communications satisfy the Katz analysis, a government agent
who monitors or reviews e-mail messages is conducting a search. This
search, unless subject to an exception, must be authorized by a
warrant supported by probable cause or it is unreasonable and
therefore unconstitutional. 9 6
III. THE STATUTORY SCHEME
As Fourth Amendment jurisprudence shifted from a propertybased standard to a doctrine that balances interests,1 97 the laws
regulating searches and seizures necessarily evolved in step. 198 The
present-day statutory scheme stems directly from the Supreme
Court's rulings in Katz v. United States' and Berger v. New York. 2°0
192. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(1)(a) (West 2000) (prohibiting the interception of
electronic communications).
193. See supranotes 215-41 (discussing pen trap and trace wiretaps).
194. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (1994) (prohibiting the use of
pen registers or trap-and-trace devices without court authorization).
195. See supra note 189 (noting that federal law prohibits random observation of e-mail
by ISPs).
196. See U.S. CONST. amend IV.; supra note 121 (discussing the warrant requirement
and exceptions under the Fourth Amendment).
197. See supra notes 118-41 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 118-41 and accompanying text.
199. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
200. 388 U.S. 41, 59-60 (1967) (holding that electronic surveillance must satisfy certain
requirements, including a warrant describing with particularity the conversations to be
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Concerned that the Supreme Court severely hampered law
enforcement,20 1 Congress passed Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.2 One provision of the Act
authorizes courts to grant warrants permitting interception of wire or
oral communications upon a finding of probable cause.2 3 The 1968
Act has become popularly known as the Federal Wiretap Act.2'

The

Act prohibits the interception of any wire2 5 or oral206 communication
by parties other than those listed in the Act2° and sets forth criteria
for obtaining a warrant to conduct surveillance. 208 When the
government satisfies the Act, therefore, it fulfills the constitutional
obligations with respect to probable cause and the issuance of

warrants.
While technology changed over the ensuing years, the Act
remained static for eighteen years until Congress amended it in
1986.209 The amendments, called the Electronic Communication
Privacy Act,210 added electronic communications to the Act's

regulations,2 11 including communications over computers, digitaldisplay pagers, and fax machines.
In addition to extending the
same
landline
communications
protections
to
wireless
collected, probable cause that a crime has been or is being committed, limited surveillance
time, names of the suspects, judicial review of the surveillance, and termination when the
government collects the information it has been seeking); see also James X. Dempsey, The
Fourth Amendment and the Internet, 607 PRACTICING L. INST. 1015, 1019 (2000) (listing
the requirements needed to permit electronic surveillance); Robert S. Steere, Note,
Keeping "PrivateE-mail" Private: A Proposalto Modify the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 231,249 (1998) (listing the Berger requirements).
201. Berger, 388 U.S. at 59-60; see also Dempsey, supra note 200; Steere, supra note
200.
202. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520
(1994)).
203. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(3) (West 2000).
204. See Steere, supra note 200, at 249.
205. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(1) (West 2000) (defining wire communication as "any aural
transfer" made through transmission facilities).
206. Id. § 2510(2) (defining oral communication as anything "uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception").
207. Id. §2511(1)(a).
208. Id § 2516(1).
209. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986)
(codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C); see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2513, 2516-2521, 27012711, 3117, 3121-3127 (1994).
210. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(12) (West 2000).
211. Id (defining electronic communication as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing,
images, sounds, data or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system").
212. See U.S. DEP'T. OF JUST., ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, § 9-7.100 (1998) [hereinafter
AiTORNEYS' MANUAL].
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2 13
communication, the Act addressed other emerging technology. The
Act also established criteria for gaining access to electronic
communications and adopted pen register and trap-and-trace
regulations.214
At the outset, the Act prohibits the interception of the
enumerated communications2 1 ' but it provides an exception for
enumerated persons for particular offenses. 2 1 6 The Act requires a

high-level official in the Department of Justice2 17 to authorize an
application for a court order to conduct electronic surveillance via
wiretap, thus vesting accountability in one person.21 8 Applications to
21 9
judges must be in writing and include an oath or affirmation,
another constitutional requirement.2 20 Additionally, each wiretap
application must include the following: (1) The identity of the person
making the application;" (2) A full and complete statement of the
facts and circumstances on which the applying individual relied to
justify the application, including particularity with respect to the
offense, description of the facilities being used, type of
communication to be intercepted, and identity of the person;-. (3) A
full and complete statement as to whether other procedures to obtain
213. See Dempsey, supra note 200, at 1021. The Act regulates access to stored wire or
electronic communications. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2701 (West 2000).
214. See id. For an explanation of pen register and trap-and-trace technology, see
supra note 25.
215. The Act prohibits the interception of "wire communication" and "oral
communication." 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(1)-(2) (West 2000). "Wire communication" is
defined as "any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the
transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection." Id.
§ 2510(1). "Oral communication" is defined as "any oral communication uttered by a
person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any
electronic communication." Id. § 2510(2).
216. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2516(1)(a)-(p) (West 2000). The enumerated offenses include
murder, kidiapping, robbery, extortion, bribery, counterfeiting, drug-related fraud,
firearms violations, and any conspiracy to commit any of these offenses, among several
others. Id.
217. Id. § 2516(1). The high-level officials are the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney
General, Associate Attorney General, any Assistant Attorney General, any Acting
Assistant Attorney General, any Deputy Assistant Attorney General, or any Acting
Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division designated by the Attorney
General.
218. See IITRI REVIEW, supra note 53, § 3.1.1, at 3-1.
219. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(1) (West 2000).
220. In addition to ensuring that governmental actors obtain a warrant based on
probable cause, the Act further satisfies the Fourth Amendment by requiring an oath or
affirmation. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
221. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(1)(a) (West 2000).
222. Id. § 2518(1)(b).
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the information have tried and failed, or may be dangerous,223 (4) A
statement of the time period during which the surveillance will take
place; 4 (5) A full and complete statement as to previous surveillance
applications regarding the same matter.'
The judge may issue a wiretap interception order if the
application satisfies the requirements of the Act,1 6 the judge finds
probable cause, and the court order lists much of the same material as
the application, including the name of the target and the time period
during which the interception is to occur.227 If granted, the wiretap
interception order allows the government to conduct surveillance
"unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference"' for no longer
than thirty days, although the judge may grant an extension.22 9 Once
a court has authorized a wiretap interception, the court may request
periodic reports.23°
The Department of Justice views the
requirements under the Federal Wiretap Act as more restrictive than
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment."1
Because pen register and trap-and-trace searches are less
intrusive than a wiretap, 32 the Act requires less from the government

223. Id. § 2518(l)(c).
224. Id. § 2518(1)(d).
225. Id. § 2518(l)(e).
226. Id. § 2518(3).
227. Id. §2518(4).
228. Id. § 2518(4)-(5). The minimization requirement is reiterated later: "Every order
and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the authorization to intercept shall be
executed as soon as practicable, [and] shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the
interception." Id. § 2518(5). The minimization requirement stems from Berger, which
required the government to limit the surveillance time period and to terminate the
surveillance when the information sought had been collected. See Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41, 59-60 (1967).
229. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(5) (West 2000).
230. See id. § 2518(6).
231. See ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 212, at 9-7.100. The Attorneys' Manual
states, "[S]everal of Title III's provisions are more restrictive than what is required by the
Fourth Amendment." According to the Attorneys' Manual, one such provision requires
federal investigative agencies to submit interception-order requests to the Department of
Justice for review and approval before they are submitted to a court. Id.
232. While a wiretap allows the interception of conversations, pen registers and trapand-trace devices collect only numeric information, including numbers dialed from a
certain location and numbers dialed to a certain location from another telephone. See,
e.g., United States v. Brown, 351 F. Supp. 38, 39-40 (W.D. N.C. 1972) (excluding evidence
obtained by a wiretap that was not authorized pursuant to the Federal Wiretap Act). The
court concluded that the "[liegislative history of the statute ... demonstrates.., that
Congress intended that wiretapping-that extraordinary invasion of the Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures-should be treated by the
Justice Department as a serious business." Id.
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to conduct such surveillance. 3 For example, rather than requiring
high-level Department of Justice approval, a pen register or trap-andtrace application requires only an application by "an attorney for the
Government." 34 If the application satisfies the requirements of the
Act, the court must issue an order authorizing installation of a pen
register or trap-and-trace device. 5 Conversely, under the Act's
wiretap provisions, the court has 6discretion as to whether to issue a
warrant authorizing surveillanceP

Thus, the statutory scheme seeks to codify the Fourth
Amendment requirements set forth in Katz and Berger that
governmental actors conduct searches with a warrant that is based on

probable cause. z 7 The scheme raises the procedural bar by requiring
high-level Department of Justice approval for the most intrusive
surveillances,238mandating minimization of intrusions, 239 and limiting
the duration of the search. 240 The requirements for gaining approval
for electronic surveillance, therefore, exceed the requirements for
typical search warrants, which may be granted by a magistrate and are
unlimited as to what offenses are covered.2 4'
IV. REGULATING CARNIVORE
While Congress may have considered e-mail communication
when it amended the Federal Wiretap Act in 1986, it could not have
predicted the ubiquitous presence of e-mail in today's culture and
probably did not anticipate a mechanism like Carnivore. 24 2 As a
233. See 18 U.S.C. § 3122(a) (1994).
234. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(3) (West 2000) ("[T]he judge may enter an ex parte
order ....) (emphasis added).
235. See 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (1994) ("[Tlhe court shall enter an ex parte order....")
(emphasis added).
236. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(3) (West 2000) ("[T]he judge may enter an ex parte
order ....) (emphasis added).
237. See Steere, supra note 200, at 249.
238. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2516(1) (West 2000).
239. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(3) (West 2000).
240. Id. § 2518(5).
241. See Dempsey, supra note 200, at 1019.
242. Congress passed the Electronic Communication Privacy Act in 1986, predating the
massive growth of the Internet in the 1990s. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986)
(codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C); see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2711, 3117,
3121-3127 (1994). For a discussion of the development of the Internet during the past two
decades, see ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (striking down as
unconstitutional sections of the Communications Decency Act), affd 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
Between 1989 and 1996, Internet usage grew by 100 times, from fewer than 90,000
computers in 1989 to more than 9.4 million computers connected to the Internet by 1996.
Md
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result, the statutory scheme Congress designed to govern surveillance
of cellular phones, cordless phones, and computer-to-computer
technology 243 now regulates an interception device that Congress
probably never contemplated. The question, therefore, is whether
the present statutory scheme adequately regulates the use of
Carnivore as a surveillance tool.
The statutory scheme governing surveillance grew directly out of
Supreme Court decisions defining the Fourth Amendment.244 The
Fourth Amendment, as defined by the Supreme Court over the
course of the twentieth century, protects citizens against unwarranted
intrusions by the government.245 "The basic purpose of the
Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by government officials. The Fourth Amendment thus
gives concrete expression to a right of the people which is basic to a
free society." 246 Responding to the Supreme Court's guidance,
Congress passed laws to codify these decisions and ensure that law
enforcement officials met the Fourth Amendment principles the
rulings advanced.2 47 By subjecting its agents using Carnivore to the
statutory requirements of traditional electronic surveillance, the FBI
hopes to ensure that its agents meet the constitutional standards that
the Supreme Court enunciated.
As a general proposition, the use of Carnivore by government
agents likely will meet the Fourth Amendment's requirements and
the statutory scheme advancing the Amendment's principles. Absent
bad faith, most agents will conduct searches no broader than allowed
by law and by particular court orders. Even if the FBI configured
Carnivore to operate at its most invasive settings-collecting all the
information about a targeted suspect that passes through a data
stream-the collection would be no more invasive than a wiretap.
Carnivore is capable of conducting far less invasive searches as well,
gleaning as little information from an e-mail message as the identities

243. See Dempsey, supra note 200, at 1019.
244. See Steere, supra note 200, at 249.
245. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411-12 (1997); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 361 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59-60 (1967); see also Lloyd L.
Weinreb, Generalitiesof the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 47, 85 (1974) ("The
privacy secured by the [F]ourth [A]mendment fosters large social interests. Political and
moral discussion, affirmation and dissent, need places to be born and nurtured, and
shelter[ed] from unwanted publicity.").
246. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,528 (1967).
247. See supra notes 198-202.
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of the sender and recipient.2 4 If FBI agents follow the statutorily
mandated procedure and gain approval to deploy Carnivore, the
agents will likely meet their Fourth Amendment obligations requiring
searches and seizures to be regulated by a warrant supported by
probable cause.249
Several operational issues, however, complicate the analysis of
adequate regulation, the most troubling of which involves the
When FBI agents
exposure to non-targeted communications.
conduct a wiretap and listen to conversations, they are only exposed
to conversations on the telephone for which they have a court's
authorization to monitor.y ° The same is not true for Carnivore
searches. When FBI agents tap into an ISP's data stream, the tap
necessarily exposes every packet that flows through that data stream,
even those packets not authorized for interception and search by
court orderl 1 The FBI, using Carnivore, avoids collecting nonauthorized information by relying on Carnivore's filters, which match
the court order to particular packets and allow only the targeted
packets to be stored. 2 12 But the filters do not eliminate or even
diminish the FBI's exposure to the non-authorized information in an
ISP's data stream, because it is currently technologically impossible to
isolate a single data stream that carries only those packets sent to a
targeted person. Rather, the FBI must tap into a broader data
stream, which carries both targeted and non-targeted information,
and allows the Carnivore filters to weed out the non-targeted
messages. Compare this technology to telephones, which allow taps
to be placed on a single line and thus expose only conversations that
cross that particular line. As long as the FBI is tapped into the ISP's
system, it necessarily is exposed to communications it has no
authorization to monitor.
The danger, of course, is that Carnivore will collect information
beyond what a warrant allows and thus will violate a person's Fourth
Amendment rights. Over-collection might occur as a result of
innocent human error in configuring the Carnivore filter. 3 But a
248. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 237-41 and accompanying text.
250. See IITRI REVIEW, supra note 53, § 3.1.1, at 3-1 to 3-2. If the agents hear
conversations that exceed the scope of the court order, then they are required to turn off
the wiretap so that they do not collect information beyond that which they are authorized
to collect. See id.
251. See id. § ES.4, at xi.
252. See id. § ES.4, at xi-xii.
253. In fact, the IITRI notes that the potential for such an error is present and
compounded by the fact that the FBI constructs the filters based on interception orders.
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over-collection

would

occur when

an

agent

intentionally exceeds his authority. Without question, purposeful
over-collection is the precise type of activity the Fourth Amendment
and the statutory scheme prohibit.254
Just as over-collection may occur with Carnivore, it may also
occur with traditional forms of surveillance. For example, an agent
might overhear conversations outside the scope of a court order while

conducting a wiretap, either inadvertently or purposefully. The
troubling difference between Carnivore and traditional surveillance,
however, is that Carnivore allows exposure to a significantly greater
volume of non-authorized information. In addition to exposing
agents to non-authorized information involving the target of an
investigation, Carnivore exposes agents to non-authorized
information involving non-targets.
Compounding the issue of over-collection is the fact that

Carnivore does not provide for auditingP 5 Without even minimal
auditing, the FBI is unlikely to notice and punish purposeful overcollection. Carnivore's inability to audit agents severely diminishes
agent accountability and seriously erodes the deterrent purpose of the
Fourth AmendmentY6

A final factor complicating the issue of over-collection involves
the FBI's decision to include in one device the ability to conduct

wiretap-equivalent as well as a pen register or trap-and-trace
equivalent searchesY 7 Simply clicking one button can switch
Carnivore from a low collection mode (the equivalent of a pen
register or a trap-and-trace) to its highest collection mode (the
Thus, both a simple mistake and an
equivalent of a wiretap)."

Id. § 3.2.2, at 3-5. An unclear order may result in the creation of a filter that does not
match the specifications of the order. Id The problematic filter then may either
overcollect or undercollect. Md During the course of its review, the IITRI discovered a
case in which an agent did not fully understand a court order. Id. The FBI asked the U.S.
Attorney to gain approval for another court order to eliminate the ambiguities and allow
for the construction of an appropriate filter. IL
254. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) ("The Security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic
to a free society.").
255. See id. § 4.2.4, at 4-5. "Auditing is crucial in security. It is the means by which
users are held accountable for their actions. There is no auditing in Carnivore." Id.
256. See Steere, supra note 200, at 236 (noting that the exclusionary rule "operates as a
deterrent to government agents who violate the Fourth Amendment by excluding
evidence seized as a result of such conduct. .. ").
257. See IITRI REvIEW, supra note 53, § 5.3, at 5-2.
258. See id. Among its recommendations, the IITRI suggests that the FBI separate
these functions into two devices. Id.
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unnoticed purposeful act have the same result: the vast overcollection of information.1 9 In a system with no auditing and very
little accountability, the simplicity with which one can alter the
parameters of a search is troubling.
A statutory scheme designed to regulate systems such as
Carnivore could easily handle the issues of over-collection, auditing,
and accountability. But the FBI deployed Carnivore before Congress
considered the system and was able to respond to concerns about the
technology with legislation. As a result, the dated statutory structure
predictably fails to cover all of the sharp edges of a new technology.
Although the public may be under-protected in certain
circumstances when Carnivore is deployed, the public may be overprotected in other situations. Depending on the scope of an
interception order, Carnivore is capable of conducting a wide variety
of searches and collecting various amounts of information.2 6 ° Every

use of Carnivore must satisfy the Federal Wiretap Act, even when
some deployments fall far short of collecting as much information as
would be obtained with a wiretap. For example, Carnivore can be
configured to capture information equivalent to a pen register or a
trap-and-trace device. Carnivore would only be used in this way after
satisfying wiretap laws, which require the approval of a high-level
official in the Department of Justice. A traditional pen register or
trap-and-trace search, however, requires a lower level of approval.261
While over-protection should not be a cause for alarm for
privacy advocates, the circumstances to which the over-protection can
be attributed should cause concern. Over-protection in this context is
yet another symptom of the outdated statutory scheme regulating
Carnivore. Similar to the over-collection issue, over-protection exists
because the laws regulating Carnivore never contemplated such a
system and thus are ill-equipped to deal with the new technology.

259. It is equally true to say that a simple mistake or purposeful act could lead to the
vast undercollection of information, but an undercollection does not raise constitutional
violations with respect to agents exceeding their authority.
260. Carnivore is capable of acting as a wiretap, collecting entire e-mail messages, or as
a pen-register or a trap-and-trace device, collecting information indicating who sent a
message and to whom it was intended to reach. See supra notes 50-55 (discussing the
scope of information collected via a wiretap, pen-register, and trap-and-trace device).
261. See 18 U.S.C. § 3122(a) (1994) (allowing "[a]n attorney for the Government" to
apply for a court order authorizing a pen register or trap-and-trace search).
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V. CONCLUSION

In an age of ever-expanding technological promise, Carnivore
represents the nation's first journey into the use of the Internet as a
law enforcement tool. Even Carnivore's harshest critics do not
dispute that the system has the capability of serving as a highly
effective law enforcement tool.2 62 Carnivore can conduct broad
searches that gather large chunks of information and smaller searches
that collect specific pieces of information, or it can collect any amount
of information between these extremes. Carnivore accomplishes
these collection tasks without interfering
with ongoing
communications
or with the systems over which these
communications are conducted.
But Carnivore has several glaring and troubling deficiencies,
several of which implicate the values our nation protects with the
Fourth Amendment. Without the ability to audit agents who conduct
investigations, Carnivore fails to provide a means by which the public
can be assured that the system is used properly. Without an auditing
function, Carnivore further fails to offer assurances to the public that
the system will not be abused due to the lack of accountability.
Therefore, the important deterrent function of the Fourth
Amendment suffers greatly.
In addition to the operational shortcomings of Carnivore,
another serious problem exists with respect to the system: The
present statutory structure governing electronic surveillance is
inadequate to regulate the use of Carnivore. Congress enacted the
two statutes regulating electronic surveillance, the Federal Wiretap
Act and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, without
comprehending the possibility of a system as powerful as Carnivore.
Neither statute speaks adequately to the issues of over-collection of
information;
exposure
to
non-authorized
and
non-target
communications; or the lack of auditing, accountability, and thus
deterrence.
Congress drafted the two statutes in response to
Supreme Court decisions dealing with electronic surveillance, and
they have served as the baseline that government actors must cross in
order to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Because statutes do not
satisfactorily address the over-collection, exposure, and auditing and
accountability issues, and because each of these problems could arise
during every Carnivore search, the Carnivore system requires a new
statutory model.

262. See Pierce Statement, supra note 16.
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While Carnivore offers law enforcement a number of attractive
strengths in conducting investigations in the Internet age, it presents
troubling problems that require Congress's attention. Congress must
investigate the Carnivore system, considering the system in light of
past Fourth Amendment electronic surveillance jurisprudence, and
tailor a statute that answers the legitimate privacy concerns that
critics have raised. The statute should require Carnivore to include
an auditing function that will satisfy the current accountability
shortcomings. In addition, because Carnivore exposes governmental
actors to so much non-authorized and non-targeted information, the
statute should require stricter judicial oversight than is required with
traditional electronic surveillance. Finally, the statute should provide
harsh penalties for Fourth Amendment violations that occur due to
intentional over-collection of information. The penalties should
exceed those allowed by the statutes presently in place because the
potential and opportunity for over-collection with Carnivore vastly
exceeds abuse of traditional methods of electronic surveillance.
While Carnivore has a role to play in American law enforcement, its
present operational deficiencies and the antiquated statutory scheme
regulating the system threaten to undermine the values protected by
the Fourth Amendment.
FRANK J. EICHENLAUB

